
In the United States District Court
for the District OF DELAWARE

MANUEl NIEVES/ PEtitiONER

Thomas Carroll, Warden, Attorney and Carl C. Danbery, Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Respondent. Civ. Add. No. 16-328-6MS



Petitioner's Reply

Pursuant to hule Sof the Rules Coverning Section 1254 Actions 28U.S.C. toll. 81254, petitioner states the following capty to the Respondents answer for denial of relief for writ of habeas corpus.

In live of the statement of facts pleady briefed by the record, the ARE NOT REMARKED FOR the SAKE of judicus I ECONOMY.

Discussion

The petitioner exised in his tederal habeas petition for relief the following claims: (1) Abuse of the state supreme court's denial of consideration for trial counsels ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) violation of the Contraditation Clause for using a videotape statement of the victim and (3) prosecutorial misconduct under Drady for tailing to inform the detense in a timely manner of the use of the videotape violating the petitioner's due process.

Deverning Legal Principles

A. Under AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only 'on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Generally, AEDPA "Modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing a state prisoner application in order to prevent tectral court's retrials and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 885,693,122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed. 2d 914 (2002).

B. Absent exceptional circumstances, a tederal court cannot grant, a tederal habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all MEANS of SUSIGN (b), D'Sullivan y Boerche, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 [Ed. 2] (1999), Picardy Course, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 569, 30 L.Ed. 22438(1971). This procedure requirement is meant to require the petitioner, to give "state court's one full opportunity to resolve Any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate REVIEW PROCESS" I Sullivany Boercke, 226 U.S. at 844-45; Wrotsy. Vaughar 228 F. 3d 178, 192 (3d Cip. 2000),

C. To establish exhaustment, a petitioner must demonstrate that the habeas claim was "lairly presented" to the state's highest court, Either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding. Lambert V. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 50b, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); Coverdale V. Suyder 2000 WL 1897290 at #2 (D.DEl. DEC 12, 2000). However, claims under MERIT FOR PROCE durally default ARE extegorized diffERENTLY AND ARE AVAILABLE FOR CONSICERATION by A TEDERAL COURT UNDER "CAYSE AND Actual prejudice resulting there from , or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will exist if the court does not review the claims.

Coleman v. Thompson, 201 U.S. 727, 750-51, 1115(E. 2546, 115 LEd. 2d 640 (1991); Mc Candless v. Vaughn, M. F. 3d 255, 260 (3d Cic. 1999); Casnell v. Byan, 953 F.21853,861-62 (3d Cie 1992). Compare with Baretost, super, at 893, n. 4, under 18U.S.C. 82253 requiring An overview of the claims in the hobers petition and a general Assessment of their Merits. It does not require full consideration of the factual or legal basis adduced in support of the claims. But that he has been denied a Constitutional Right Dasiv.

Angelone, 307F.3J 487(C.J.4 2000); Wheat v. dohnson, 238F.3d 357(C.J. (MM c)

D. The state court's adjudication of the petitioners claims ARE: I. A RESULT OF DECISIONS that ARE CONTRARY to JOR INVOLVED IN A UNREASONABLE Application of clearly Established TEDERAL law, as determiNED by the Supreme Tourt of the United States, and

L. A RESULT IN A decision (S) that were based on UNREASONABLE determinations of the facts in light of the Evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28U.S.C.S.D.S.Y.(d)(1),(2); Williams v. Jaylor, 52TU.S.362, 412, 120 S.C.E.

1995, 196 [Ed. 21 389 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250 F. 3d, 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). A

claim has been adjudicated on the mexits for the purposes of 28U.S.C.

The petitioner's case demonstrates actual prejudice that we merely

that the energy of the court proceeding. that the ERRORS of trial and before created possibilities of prejudice but that they worked to his actual and substantial disavantage, infecting his Entire trial with exports of constitutional dimensions.
Murray V. Grrier, 1990, S. at 494, 165 S.Ct. 1639, 91 L.Ed. 2d, 397 (1986) Failure to review the petitioner claims will result in a fundamental Miscarciage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 158? 146 L.Ed. 23 518 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F. 3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001).

DROUND ONE leial Course Was INETECTIVE IN The DEE-teial Stage

Our system of justice is MEANT to ENSURE FAIRNESS IN the Adversarial

CRIMINAL PROCESS UNITED STATES V. MORRISON, 199 U.S. 361, 101 SCL 665 (1981).

This MEANS that a detendant is Entitled to Effective Assistance of course! Nimmelman v. Morrison, J.S. 185(£. 1574, 1484 (1986), McMann v. Nichardson, 397 U.S. 759, 77 W. 11, 90 SCL 1441, 1449 in 14 (1970).

Thus, the type of representation a detendant is given is crucial to his Sixth Amendment Right. The standard for judging inettective assistance of course's conduct, is an objective standard of reason-ableness. Jounger v. State, Del S.p., 561 A. 2652, 556 (1990) (citing) Steickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.C.E. 2052 (1984), And in DEVIEWING SUCH CLAIM(S), A REVIEWING COURT MUST look At the totality of the circumstances. Strickland supra, Densiv State, Del Supr. 150 121382,384 (1982), A pre-Strickland CASE. Compare to Albury V. State, Del Supe, 55/ 1.26 53 (1988).

to the present case course did not effect reasonable investigation of the state's case, in order to prepare for trial including:

I. Pailing to meet with the detendant in order to effect

preparation. Course only came to see the petitioner once at his place of incapperation, while waiting to go to trial and refused to

RESPONDE to all letters of inquiry.

2. By doing so, course tailed to properly review his client the

Applicable principles of law regarding him.

3. Retured to call specific withers for teial who would had been helpful for his detense for tile motion for dismissal of evidence. T. hetused to raise any meritous issues on direct appeal.

Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, By Submitting A Videotope Of the Victim Violating the Controllation Clause.

Under Delaware's Controllation Clause, a violation may accure under two broad categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial judge allowance on the scope of cross-examption. The first reflects the recognition that the "literal right to control the witness at the time of trial, that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confront-Ation Clause. California v. Green, 399U.S.149,157,90 S.Ct. 1938,1934, 26 L.Ed. 2d 489 (1970). The second category of cases is exemplified by Davis y Alaska 415U.S.308,318,94,5.Ct. 105,7111,39 LEd 2d 347 (1974), in which Although SOME CROSS-EXAMINATION of a prosecution witness was allowed, the trial court did not permit defense course to "expose to the jury the facts from which jurops, as the sole tiers of fact and credition tyrcould appropriately draw references relating to the reliability of the witness. Controutation MEANS MORE than being able to controut the witnesses physically Davis, supra, at 315,945.CE, at 1110.

Delaware has recognized that the Controllation Clayse, do arise because such restrictions may effectively EMA sculpte the right of cross-EXAMINA-tion itself. Smith v. Minois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 278, 750, 19 LEd. 2d 956 (1968). Under the second extegory "the cross-examiner is permitted to delve into the witness story to test the witness perceptions and MEMORY, but is also allowed to impeach, i.e., direct, the witness Davis 415U.S. st 316,99 S.Ct. st 1110. This case out-lines the problems of both extegories inferences under DRE. 404 (b). A precondition of admission of Rule 101cb) Evidence is that the trial judge must find that:

(i) the Evidence is material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case; (ii) it is being introduced for a purpose permitted by the Pule; (iii) the prior bad acts are subject to proof by clear and conclusive evidence; (iv) the prior acts are not "too remote in time from the charged offense; and (v) the probative value of the charged offense is not outweighted by the introduction of the prior bad acts. Here, the prosecution tailed at all time preconditions. It trial the prosecution entered as direct evidence of the detendants quit, a videotope contiscated from his home which was allegedly proof of his Engagement of child molestation.

The defense offered as proof that no such acts had accured his own testimony and a print-out-copy of his cable bill for the alleged times of the accusations. See attached copy thereof marked exhibit (a). Noting that it gives no listings of such programing. The trial record and the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the victims testimony in court was very inconsistent with her out-of-court statement. As such and without more the prosecution introduction of both the video tape and child victims testimony was no more than Hearsay. News v. State, 337A. 2d at 13 (1975). The state did not have a strong case, and its reliance on a conviction was merely based soley on these two factors. Without more, the state committed a plain error that was not only clear. But jeopardize the talkness and integrity of the trial process. Mainwright v. State, 201A. 2d 1016, 1180 (1986).

I. The victim, his eight year old god-daughter had alleged that the petitioner hause Nieves, had her watch pornographic video's. The state elicited this tape to show the petitioner's prior bad act. However, it was discovered at trial through testimony of his son, that the tape was his and taken out of belongings. There was no other physical evidence offered by the state of his charged offenses.

Daeden v. Wainweight, 177 U.S. 168, 183, 91 L.Ed. 2d 194, 106 S.C. 1961(1986).

Ramseur v. Beyer, 183 F.2d 1216, 1239(3d Cir. 1992) (EN DANC). The MORE important the witness to the government's case, the More important the detendant's right, derived from the Controlation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. "Duited States v. Toster, 300 S. App. D.C. 78, 986 F.2d S41, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Controlation Clause consideration are Especially cogent when the testimony of a witness is critical to the prosecution's case against a detendant." United States v. Lynch, 163 U.S. App. D.C. 6, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022(D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. A. & Stancil Ville, 1977 F.2d 11128, 1933 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. A. & Stancil Ville, 1977 F.2d 11128, 1933 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. A. & Stancil Ville, 1979 (6th Cir. 1990).


The latter part of the petitioner's agrument is that the prosecution committed misconduct under <u>Brady</u> for tailing to inform the detense in voliation of timely due process. In this instant case, the prosecution did not disclose to the detense prior to trial the nature or context of the victims testimony. The prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose such evidence and duty to "learn of any taporable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in a case, hyles v. <u>Whitley</u> 5170.5.117,132,137,113 S.CL 1355,131 L.Ed. 2d 190 (1993). The state's tailure to inform of its witness testimony as directly its point and chief undermined the detense, in voliation of due process under <u>Brady</u>. <u>Bagley</u>, 173 U.S. at 683,105 S.Ct. 3375.

should reverse and variate the petitioner's conviction.

Dated: February 18,2007

* Manuel Nieves #164723

	Account Nu	mber 250121-	02 Name MAN	UEL NIEVES		
	Lost Staten	nent Date 1/11	1/02 Amount	275.16	Stateme	nt 1
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	5/11/60	STATENE	NT BALANCE	1.1	0.08	110.08
	6/10/00	LATE FE	-		2.80	112.66
	6/12/00		THLY SERVICES	i "	3.40	135.48
	6/12/08	7/11/00 STAN		1	4.40	159.38
	6/12/08		ERTER RENTAL	ı	2.50	162.38
	6/12/00		TE CONTROL	- 1	.10	152.40
	6/12/00	7/11/00 FCC	REGULATORY FEE	.	. 04	152.52
	6/12/00	7/11/00 UTIL	ITY TRX	1	1.87	153.59
	6/12/00	7/11/00 FRAN	CHISE FEE		2.53	165.12
	6/11/00	STATEME	NT BALANCE	18	5.12	166.12
	7/07/00	CHECK	BCH#-	07558 11	0.05~	56.64
	7/10/00	LATE FE	E		2.98	58.04
and the sound in	第 1 7/12/88	6/11/00 ALL NON	THLY SERVICES	1 2	3.40	81.44



2/28/02

Field disco completed - 1/21/02

eregenal install date not available, but it was prior to the 4/10/97 conversion to Conversep.

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	/11/80	FCC REGI	ULATORY	FEE	l .	.04	198,48	
	/11/00	UTILITY	TAK		F	1.07	109.55	
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		.01	8.25~
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9/02/00 9/05/00	RENOTE CONTROL	.01~	8.59~
		.14-	6.74-
9/02/00 9/05/00	FRANCHISE FEE	.34-	9.68-
9/05/00!	TRANSACTION FEE	1.99	7.09~
	8/12/86 9/11/86 8/11/86 9/85/80 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/86 9/82/88 9/85/88	8/12/86 9/11/86 FRANCHISE FEE 8/11/06 STATEMENT BALANCE 9/85/00 9/85/88 ERSIC 9/82/00 9/85/88 BASIC 9/82/88 9/85/86 STANDARD 9/82/88 9/85/86 STANDARD 9/82/88 9/85/86 FCC REGULATORY FEE 9/82/88 9/85/88 CONVERTER RENTAL 9/82/88 9/85/88 UTILITY TAR 9/82/88 9/85/88 FRANCHISE FEE	8/12/86 9/11/88 FRANCHISE FEE 2.53 8/11/86 STATEMENT BALANCE 168.12 9/85/88 CHECK BCH#-87388 170.88- 9/82/88 9/85/88 BASIC 1.29- 9/82/88 9/85/88 STANDARD 3.26- 9/82/88 9/85/88 STANDARD 3.26- 9/82/88 9/85/88 CONVERTER RENTHL .33- 9/82/88 9/85/88 REMOTE CONTROL .01- 9/02/88 9/85/88 UTILITY TAX .14- 9/02/88 9/85/88 FRANCHISE FEE .34-


	Account Number 2	50121-02 Name MANUEL N	IEVES	
	Last Statement Date	1/11/02 Amount	275.16 Statement	t 1
	Fram	escription	Amount	Total
	9/05/00	FRANCHISE FEE	.10	5.99-
		LL MONTHLY SERVICES	23.40	16.41
	9/12/00 10/11/00	STANDARD	24,40	40.81
	9/12/00 10/11/00	CONVERTER RENTAL	2.58	49.31
	9/12/00 10/11/00	RENOTE CONTROL	.10	43.41
	9/12/80/10/11/80	FCC REGULATORY FEE	.04	43.45
	9/12/08/10/11/08	UTILITY TAX	1.07	44.52
5-14-7-21-74-75	9/12/00/10/11/00	FRANCHISE FEE	2,53	47.05
	21 %	TATEMENT BALANCE	47.85	47.05
		CC REGULATORY FEE	.81-	47.64
	95	ATE FEE	2.00	49,04
	ara.	LL MONTHLY SERVICES	23,40	72.44
	10/12/90/11/11/00	STRNDRAD	24.40	96.84

Account Number	250121-82 Name MANUEL N	IEVES	•
Last Statement Date	1/11/62 Amount	275.16 Staten	ent 1
From		Amount	Tota
10/12/00 11/11/00	CONVERTER HENTRL	2.50	99.34
10/12/00 11/11/00	RENOTE CONTROL	.10	99,44
10/12/00 11/11/00	FCC REGULATORY FEE	.04	99,48
10/12/00 11/11/00	UTILITY TAX	1.07	100.55
10/12/00/11/11/00	FRANCHISE FEE	2.53	103.68
10/11/08	STATEMENT BALANCE	103.06	103.66
11/10/00	LATE FEE	2.60	185.66
11/12/00 12/11/00	ALL MONTHLY SERVICES	47.80	152,88
11/12/00 12/11/00	CONVERTER RENTAL	2.50	155.38
11/12/80 12/11/00	REMOTE CONTROL	10	155,48
11/12/00 12/11/00	FCC REGULATORY FEE	.04	155.52
11/12/00/12/11/00	UTILITY TAX	1.07	156.59
11/12/88 12/11/88	FRANCHISE FEE	2.53	159.12

Account Number	250121-02 Name MANUEL NI	EVES	
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11/11/08	STATEMENT BALANCE	159.12	159.12
11/25/08	CHECK BCH#-08484	159,12-	.00
12/12/98 1/11/	DI ALL MONTHLY SERVICES	47.80	47.60
12/12/00 1/11/		2.50	50.30
12/12/00 1/11/	DI RENOTE CONTROL	.10	50.40
12/12/00 1/11/	TI FOG REGULATORY FEE	.04	50.44
12/12/00 1/11/		1.07	51.51
12/12/08 1/11/	01 FRANCHISE FEE	2.53	54.04
12/10/08	STATEMENT BALANCE	54.84	54.04
1/10/01	LATE FEE	2,80	56.04
1/12/01 2/11/0	JI ALL MONTHLY SERVICES	47.60	103.84
1/12/81 2/11/0		2.58	106.34
1/12/81 2/11/		.10	106.44

Ø 011

Account Number	250121-82 Name MANUEL I	VIEVES	
Last Statement Date	1/11/62 Amount	275.16 Staten	nent 1
From Na To	Description	Amount	ile) or ill
1/12/01 2/11/01	FCC REGULATORY FEE	,04	196.45
1/12/01 2/11/01		1.07	107.55
1/12/01 2/11/01		2.53	110.08
1/11/01	STATEMENT BALANCE	110.00	110.08
2/10/01	LATE FEE	2.00	112.08
2/12/01 3/11/01	LALL MONTHLY SERVICES	47.80	159.80
2/12/01 3/11/01	CONVERTER RENTAL	2.59	162.38
2/12/01 3/11/01	REMOTE CONTROL	.10	162.48
2/12/01 3/11/01	FCC REGULATORY FEE	.04	162.52
2/12/01 3/11/01	UTILITY TAX	1.07	169.59
2/12/01 3/11/01	FRANCHISE FEE	2.53	165.12
2/10/81	STATEMENT BALANCE	155.12	165.12
3/10/01	TRANSACTION FEE	1.99	168.11



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Account N	umber	250121-02	Name 1	ANUEL NI	EVES				
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3/10/01	3/11/01	CONVERT	ER RENTA	L		.17-	224	.88	
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3/10/01	3/11/01	FRANCHIS	SE FEE			.19-	224	.60	
3/12/01	4/11/61	Standari	D C		2	6.05-	196	.55	
3/12/01	4/11/01	HOME BOX	X OFFICE		1	3.70-	162	. 85	[
3/12/01	4/11/81	BASIC				9.78-	173	, 15	ĺ
3/12/01	4/11/01	FCC REGI	ULATORY	FEE		. 04-	173	.11	ĺ
3/12/01	4/11/01	CONVERTE	ER RENTRI	L		2.50-	170	.61	
3/12/01	4/11/01	REMOTE (CONTROL			10-	170	. 51	1
3/12/01	4/11/01	UTILITY	TAX			1.15-	169	. 36	
9/12/01	4/11/01	FRANCHIS	SE FEE			2.91-	166	. 45	
3/16/01		STATEMENT E	BALANCE		16	5.45	156	. 45	

Account Number	250121-02 Name MANUEL !	ITEVES	
Last Statement D	ate 1/11/02 Amount	275.16 Statem	ent 1
	To Description	Amount	Total
3/16/01	UNRETURNED EQUIPMENT	150.00	315.45
3/23/01	CASH 8CH#-0599	1 184.88-	132.45
3/24/61	UNRETURNED EQUIPMENT	150.00-	17.55-
3/24/01	RECONNECTION	16.08	. 45
3/24/81	UTILITY TAX	.38	.83
3/24/01	FRANCHISE FEE	96	1.79
3/24/01 4/11/	'01 STANDARD	15.83	18.62
3/24/01 4/11/		8.22	26.84
3/24/01 4/11/		5.62	32.66
3/24/01 4/11/		,02	32.68
3/24/01 4/11/		1.59	34.18
3/24/01 4/11/		.86	34.24
3/24/01 4/11/		.69	34.93

	Account Nu	ımber	250121-02 Name MANUEL	NIEVES	
	Lost Staten	nent Date	1/11/62 Amount	275.16 Statems	ent 1
	From	To	Description United to the	Amount	Tota
	3/24/01	4/11/01	FRANCHISE FEE	1.75	36.68
	3/25/01		STATEMENT BALANCE	36.68	35.58
	3/27/61	4/11/01	HOME BOX OFFICE	2.35-	34.33
	3/27/01	4/11/01	CONVERTER RENTAL	1.25-	93.08
	3/27/01	4/11/91	REMOTE CONTROL	. 05-	33.03
	3/27/81	4/11/01	UTILITY TAX	.87-	32.96
	3/27/01	4/11/01	FRANCHISE FEE	.28-	32,76
1 (3)	4/10/01		LATE FEE	2,00	34.75
	4/10/01		TAXES-LATE FEE	.11	34.87
	4/12/01	5/11/91	ALL MONTHLY SERVICES	61.79	96.57
	4/12/01		FCC REGULATORY FEE	.04	95.61
	4/12/01			1.31	97.92
	4/12/01			3.32	101.24

Account Numb	er 250121-02	Name NANUEL NIE	4E8	
Last Statement	Date 1/11/02	Amount 27	5.15 Statems	ent 1
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4/11/01	ISTATEMENT		1G1.24	101.24
5/10/01	LATE FEE		2.00	103.24
5/10/01	TAXES-LATE	FEE	.11	193.35
5/12/01 6/1	L1/01 ALL MONTHL	Y SERVICES	61.70	165.85
	L1/01 FCC REG		. 0 .4	165.89
歸 5/12/01 6/1	1/01 UTILITY	TAX	1.31	155.48
题 5/12/81 5/1	1/01 FRANCHI	SE FEE	3.31	169.71
5/11/81	STATEMENT	BRLANCE	159.71	169.71
5/29/01	CHECK	BCH#-02077	15.00-	154.71
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
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
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
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
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
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












IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MANUEL NIEVES,)) No. 352, 2002			
v.	Defendant Below, Appellant,)) Court Below: Superior) of the State of Delaware) and for New Castle Cou	in		-
	DELAWARE,)) ID No. 0107022700		7003 F	DELAYARE
	Plaintiff Below, Appellee.)))	SOUTH THE SECOND	思 二 で	RE SUPPEME
Submitted: January 14, 2003 Decided: February 11, 2003					0000

Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.

ORDER

This 11th day of February 2003, it appears to the Court that:

- 1. In March 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted appellant Manuel Nieves of numerous counts of rape and related crimes. In this appeal, Nieves asserts two grounds of error: (i) the trial judge failed to maintain impartiality before the jury thus denying him a fair trial and (ii) the trial judge's decision to reject the defendant's attempts to place before the jury his lack of a criminal record denied him a fair trial. We find no merit in either argument and conclude the conviction should be affirmed.
- 2. The victim of alleged child molestation testified as a prosecution witness. She was eight years old at the time of trial. After she finished her

testimony, the trial judge excused her with the following words: "Jocelyn, you've done a great job. You can be excused now. Go outside and join your Mommy. Thank you very much." There was no objection to the trial judge's choice of words or a request for a curative instruction. Now, for the first time on appeal, Nieves claims the trial judge's choice of words amounted to commentary approving the substance of the victim's testimony, thus violating the Delaware Constitution's prohibition against judicial comment on the evidence. Since Nieves failed to object at trial, we review for plain error. Plain error exists when the error was so clearly prejudicial to a defendant's substantial rights that it jeopardizes the very fairness and integrity of the trial process.

3. The Delaware Constitution prohibits trial judges from commenting upon evidence offered at trial.³ Article IV, section 19 specifically provides that "judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the law." "The purpose of the provision in the Delaware Constitution is to protect the province of the jury on factual issues." Here, the trial judge's comment should be read as an attempt to calm an apprehensive witness rather than an overt expression evidencing bias. In any event, the trial judge's comment hardly rises to the level of jeopardizing the

¹ Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Del. 2001).

 $^{^{2}}$ Id

³ Feleke v. State, 620 A.2d 222, 228 (Del. 1993); Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 689 (Del. 1979).

⁴ Randy J. Holland, The Delaware State Constitution: A Reference Guide 150 (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 2002).

fairness and integrity of the trial process given the circumstances surrounding the statement and the text of the commonly given final instructions reminding the jury that they are the sole determiners of the facts.

Nieves also claims that the trial judge's decision to reject the 4. defendant's attempts to place before the jury his lack of a criminal record denied him the right to a fair trial. Twice during trial, defense counsel tried to place the fact that Nieves had no criminal record before the jury. Defense counsel asked the chief investigating officer during cross-examination whether the defendant had a criminal record. The prosecution objected on relevancy and the trial judge sustained the objection, finding the question "totally improper." The trial judge also instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel's question. Defense counsel also asked Nieves on direct examination whether he had ever been convicted of a serious crime. The prosecutor again objected on relevancy grounds and the trial judge sustained the objection. Nieves asserts that pursuant to D.R.E. 404(a)(1).5 he was entitled to place his criminal record before the jury as character evidence.

⁵ D.R.E. 404(a)(1) provides:

⁽a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

⁽¹⁾ Character of the accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.

5. Nieves misreads Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(a). "Neither the defendant nor the prosecution may offer evidence of 'general' good or bad character. To be relevant, it is necessary that the evidence, good or bad, be confined to a particular trait or character the existence or nonexistence of which would be relevant to the crime charged or the credibility of a witness." The defendant's lack of a criminal record does not correlate with any character trait in issue. The trial judge appropriately recognized that the defense could have asked the questions with the sole purpose of suggesting that no criminal record would be inconsistent with the crimes for which the defendant faced trial. Even if the trial judge had determined the questions to be relevant, the trial judge has general discretionary authority to exclude the evidence if he determines that its probative value is substantially outweighed by practical considerations such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, waste of time or danger of misleading the jury. At a minimum here, allowing the jury to hear that the defendant had no criminal record would clearly run the risk of misleading the jury into the improper inference that the lack of a criminal record would be inconsistent with guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he stood trial. Just as a criminal record can not be allowed to infer guilt, lack of a criminal record may not be allowed to

⁶ 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 4:22, p. 359.

⁷ For a general discussion of character evidence and its admissibility, see Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence 130 (West Publishing, 3rd ed. 1996).

stand for inconsistence with guilt. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err by sustaining the State's objections.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED

BY THE COURT:

Justice Cuca

oc:

Clerk of the Court Hon. Peggy L. Ableman Timothy J. Donovan, Jr.

Bernard J. O'Donnell Court's Distribution List

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MANUEL NIEVES,	§	
	§	•
Defendant Below-	§	No. 381, 2004
Appellant,	§	
	· §	Court BelowSuperior Court
v.	§	of the State of Delaware,
	§	in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,	§	Cr. ID No. 0107022700
	§	
Plaintiff Below-	§ .	
Appellee.	§	

Submitted: April 1, 2005 Decided: May 18, 2005

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices

ORDER

This 18th day of May 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

- (1) The defendant-appellant, Manuel Nieves, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's August 16, 2004 order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
- (2) In March 2002, Nieves was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of twenty counts of Rape in the First Degree, ten counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, one count of Rape in the Second Degree, and one count of Continuing Sexual Abuse of a Child. He was sentenced to a total of 322 years

incarceration at Level V. Nieves' convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.¹

- (3) In this appeal, Nieves claims that: a) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to secure an interpreter, properly prepare for trial, secure witness testimony, and investigate the motives of the victim; b) the trial judge improperly permitted a biased individual to sit on the jury; c) the trial judge's comment following the victim's testimony was unduly prejudicial; and d) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions.
- (4) In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Nieves must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.² Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."³
- (5) While Nieves claims that his counsel should have secured a Spanish interpreter, he offers no factual basis for that claim. There is no evidence in the record that Nieves was not able to communicate with his counsel in English.

¹ Nieves v. State, Del. Supr., No. 352, 2002, Steele, J. (Feb. 11, 2003).

² Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

³ Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).

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- Nieves' next claim is that the trial judge improperly permitted a (6)biased individual to sit on the jury. Specifically, Nieves argues that one of the jurors had a niece who had been sexually assaulted. While it appears that during voir dire one of the prospective jurors revealed that his niece had been sexually assaulted, that individual ultimately was dismissed from the jury. Because Nieves presents no evidence of bias on the part of the jurors who served, this claim is, therefore, without merit.
- Nieves next claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because of a remark the trial judge made following the testimony of the eight-year old victim. Specifically, the judge stated, "... you've done a great job. You can be excused now. Go outside and join your Mommy. Thank you very much." No objection was made at the time of the judge's remark. On direct appeal, this Court found

that the remark did not jeopardize Nieves' right to a fair trial given the circumstances surrounding the remark and the fact that the jury was instructed that they were the sole determiners of the facts. Because Nieves failed to raise this claim in his postconviction motion, we decline to address it in this appeal.⁴ Even if Nieves had properly raised the claim in this appeal, it would be procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.⁵

(8) Nieves' final claim is that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his convictions. Because this claim was asserted, unsuccessfully, in the Superior Court trial, it is barred in this proceeding as formerly adjudicated.⁶ The claim is without merit in any case. The testimony of the eight-year old victim provided sufficient evidence of Nieves' guilt, even though some of the specific details were contradicted by the testimony of another witness.⁷

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

Justice Justice

⁴ Supr. Ct. R. 8.

⁵ Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).

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⁷ Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1, MANUEL NIEVES	, hereby certify that I have
served a true and correct cop(ies	
following parties/person(s):	
11000 + 1001 + 1001	TO: Elizabeth R McFaelan Department of dustice 820 N. French Street Wilmington, DE 1980
TO:	TO:
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BY PLACING SAME IN A SEALED ENVI United States Hail at the Delawar 19977,	ELOPE and depositing same in the e Correctional Center, Smyrna, DE
On this 28 day of February,	200 <u>7</u> .
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